The Gemara answers: Rather, it is not difficult. This statement of Rava, that intent of piggul does not apply to collection, is referring to a case where the one slaughtering the offering says: I am hereby slaughtering this offering in order to collect its blood tomorrow. Because the collection of the blood is not considered consumption, such intent does not render the offering piggul. That statement of the baraita is referring to a case where the one collecting the blood says: I am hereby collecting its blood in order to pour the remainder of the blood on the base of the altar tomorrow. Since pouring the remains is considered consumption of the blood on the altar, such intent renders the offering piggul.

One of the Sages said to Rava: And does prohibited intent with regard to the pouring of the remainder of the blood and the burning of the sacrificial portions not disqualify the offering, as this explanation of the baraita seems to indicate?

But didn’t we learn in a baraita: One might have thought that only prohibited intent with regard to consumption of the meat is effective to render the offering piggul. From where is it derived to include the pouring of the remainder of the blood and the burning of the sacrificial portions? The verse states: ''And if any of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offerings is at all eaten [he’akhol ye’akhel ] on the third day, it shall not be accepted'' (Leviticus 7:18). It is derived from the repeated verb that the verse speaks of two types of consumption: One is consumption of the meat by man, i.e., by the priests or the owner of the offering, and the other one is consumption of the blood and the sacrificial portions on the altar.

The Gemara answers: It is not difficult. This case, where intent renders the offering piggul, is where the one sprinkling the blood says: I am hereby sprinkling the blood in order to pour the remainder tomorrow. Since sprinkling the blood is necessary for atonement, if it is performed with the intent that consumption occur beyond its designated time, the offering is rendered piggul. That case, where intent does not render the offering piggul, is where he says: I am hereby pouring the remainder in order to burn the sacrificial portions tomorrow. Although burning the portions is considered consumption, pouring the remainder of the blood is not indispensable for atonement, and therefore the offering is not rendered piggul.

§ Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, says: I heard that with regard to an inner sin offering, whose blood is sprinkled on the curtain separating the Sanctuary and Holy of Holies, dipping one’s finger in the blood in order to sprinkle it, if he does so with the intent of burning the offering on the altar the following day, renders the offering piggul.

Ilfa heard this statement and said it before Rav Padda. Rav Padda said in response: Did we derive the halakha of piggul with regard to all offerings from anything but a peace offering? The source for the halakha of piggul is the verse stated with regard to peace offerings (Leviticus 7:18). Therefore, just as with regard to a peace offering, prohibited intent while dipping one’s finger in the blood to sprinkle it on the altar does not render it piggul, as there is no requirement to sprinkle the blood of a peace offering with one’s finger rather than the containing vessel, so too, with regard to a sin offering, prohibited intent while dipping one’s finger in the blood does not render it piggul.

The Gemara challenges: But are all of the halakhot of piggul derived from the halakha of a peace offering? If that is so, then just as sacrifice of a peace offering not for its sake does not preclude its being rendered piggul, as it is still fit, so too, the halakha should be that sacrifice of a sin offering not for its sake does not preclude its being rendered piggul. In fact, the halakha is that a sin offering sacrificed not for its sake cannot become piggul.

Rather, what have you to say to explain this halakha? You must say that it is derived from an amplification of the verse. Here too, the halakha that prohibited intent while dipping one’s finger in the blood of an inner sin offering renders it piggul is derived from an amplification of the verse.

Similarly, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: I heard in this upper story that prohibited intent while dipping one’s finger in the blood of an inner sin offering renders it piggul. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish wondered [tahei] at this halakha: Did the Sages derive the halakha of piggul from anything but a peace offering? Just as with regard to a peace offering, prohibited intent while dipping one’s finger in the blood does not render it piggul, so too, with regard to a sin offering, the halakha should be that prohibited intent while dipping one’s finger in the blood does not render it piggul.

The Gemara responds: But are all of the halakhot of piggul derived from those of a peace offering? If so, just as sacrifice of a peace offering not for its sake does not preclude its being rendered piggul, so too, the halakha should be that sacrifice of a sin offering not for its sake does not preclude its being rendered piggul.

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: Indeed, all of the halakhot of piggul, even this one, are derived from a peace offering. Since in the case of a peace offering, intent to consume it outside its designated area disqualifies it, and in the case of a sin offering, sacrifice not for its sake disqualifies it, one can infer that just as intent to consume the offering outside its designated area, which disqualifies a peace offering, precludes its being rendered piggul, so too, sacrifice not for its sake, which disqualifies a sin offering, precludes its being rendered piggul. By contrast, dipping one’s finger in the blood of an inner sin offering with intent to consume it after its designated time does not render it piggul, as there is no parallel halakha with regard to a peace offering.

Rabbi Yirmeya says: This inference is inherently disjointed: What is notable about intent to consume the offering outside its designated area, which disqualifies a peace offering? It is notable in that its disqualification applies to all slaughtered offerings. This is why it precludes the offering from becoming piggul. Need you say the same with regard to disqualification by sacrifice not for its sake, which applies only to a Paschal offering and a sin offering?

Rather, what have you to say to explain this derivation? One must say that it is not based on a case-to-case comparison, but on a principle that is derived from a peace offering, namely: Any matter that disqualifies a peace offering, e.g., intent to consume it outside its designated area, precludes its being rendered piggul, and any matter that prevents atonement if not performed renders the offering piggul if performed with intent to consume it beyond its designated time.

One infers therefore that here too, with regard to an inner sin offering, any matter that disqualifies it, e.g., sacrifice not for its sake, precludes its being rendered piggul, and any matter that prevents atonement if not performed renders it piggul if it is performed with intent to consume it beyond its designated time. Accordingly, dipping one’s finger in the blood with intent to consume the offering beyond its designated time renders it piggul, as this rite is indispensable.

Rav Mari says: We learn in a mishna as well that dipping one’s finger in the blood of an inner sin offering with intent to consume it beyond its designated time renders the offering piggul (Menaḥot 12a): This is the principle: With regard to anyone who removes a handful from a meal offering, or who places the handful in a vessel, or who conveys the handful to the altar, or who burns it on the altar, if he does so with intent that the offering will be consumed after its designated time the offering is piggul.

Since the halakhot of piggul are derived from those of a peace offering, one can ask: Granted, the one who removes a handful of a meal offering can render the offering piggul, as he is considered equivalent to the one who slaughters a peace offering. Just as the blood is the essential part of an animal offering, and it is removed by slaughter, so too, the handful of a meal offering is its essential part. Likewise, the one who conveys the handful is equivalent to the one who conveys the blood of a peace offering, and the one who burns the handful is equivalent to the one who sprinkles the blood too. But to what is the one who places the handful in a vessel equivalent? From where is it derived that he, too, can render the offering piggul?

If we say that placing the handful in a vessel is comparable to collection of the blood, as both rites involve placing the essential part of the offering in a vessel, one may respond: Are these rites actually comparable? There, in the case of a peace offering, the collection of the blood is performed passively. The blood spills into the vessel by itself. Here, in the case of a meal offering, the priest takes the handful himself and places it in a vessel. Clearly, placing the handful in a vessel is not equivalent to any specific rite in the sacrifice of a peace offering.

Rather, since it is not sufficient for the handful to be sacrificed without first placing it in a service vessel, it is, perforce, an important rite. One who performs it can therefore render the offering piggul like those who perform other essential rites. Here too, with regard to dipping one’s finger in the blood of an inner sin offering, although it has no equivalent in the sacrifice of a peace offering, since it is not sufficient if the priest does not perform it, it is perforce considered part of the conveying of the blood, and the priest can render the offering piggul while performing it.

The Gemara responds: No, actually, placing the handful in a vessel is comparable to the collection of the blood. And despite the distinction that you say, namely, that here, in the case of a peace offering, the blood spills by itself, while there, in the case of a meal offering, the priest takes the handful himself and places it in the vessel, nevertheless, since both this rite and that rite involve placement of the essential part of the offering in a vessel, they are equivalent. What difference is it to me if the blood spills into the vessel by itself, and what difference is it to me if the priest takes the handful himself and places it in the vessel? By contrast, dipping one’s finger in the blood of an inner sin offering has no equivalent in a peace offering. Therefore, piggul does not apply to it.

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the principle that dipping one’s finger in the blood is considered part of conveying it to the curtain is the subject of a dispute between tanna’im. As it is taught in one baraita: With regard to an inner sin offering, dipping one’s finger in the blood with intent that it be consumed beyond its designated time renders it piggul. And it is taught in another baraita: Dipping one’s finger in the blood with intent that it be consumed beyond its designated time does not render it piggul, and neither does slaughtering the animal with the intent to dip his finger in the blood the next day render it piggul. What, is it not that this matter is a dispute between tanna’im?

The Gemara responds: No, both tanna’im agree that dipping one’s finger in the blood of an inner sin offering is part of conveying it to the curtain. Rather, this baraita, which states that a priest can render the offering piggul while dipping his finger in its blood, is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis in the mishna (13a), who hold that one can render the offering piggul while conveying the blood to the altar. That baraita, which states the opposite, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon in the mishna, who holds that one cannot render the offering piggul while conveying the blood.

The Gemara asks: If the latter baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, why is it referring specifically to dipping one’s finger? Doesn’t he say